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Conception of the Democracy Matrix

The following pages contain detailed information on the conceptual foundation of the democracy matrix.

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1. The Democracy Matrix as a New Tool for Measuring Democracy

The democracy matrix is a new tool for measuring the quality of democracy. Democracy measurement is one of the main fields of investigation of comparative political science. By way of the **gradual determination of regime quality**, and hence by way of focussing on democratic performance, it provides, in the form of empirical data material, an important contribution to other component fields of political science: thus, for instance, the findings of regime or democracy measurement can serve as a basis for testing transformation research, in order to validate or falsify the theories developed in this area using empirical evidence. Within democracy research, key theses can be empirically verified with the help of democracy measurement: like, for example, the frequently postulated transition of established democracies toward post-democracy (Crouch 2005). Finally, besides its scientific value, regime or democracy measurement also has international political significance, since development policy and development aid, in particular, can be and are oriented by its findings in the context of conditionalities (Knack/Paxton 2011).

The development of a measurement concept is generally divided into three phases:

- I. **Conceptualisation:** The focus of this phase is the elaboration of a democracy definition that is appropriate to the investigation and that is characterised by its discriminatory power and its economy. In addition, a differentiated and stringent conceptual tree must be produced, which serves as point of departure for the next steps in the work process. It is important to produce a logical vertical ordering of the different components according to their degree of abstraction: an ordering that prevents overlaps and redundancies (Munck/Verkuilen 2002).
- II. **Operationalisation:** The next step is the measurement of the concept tree that has been developed by way of the attribution of indicators for empirical measurement to the individual components and subcomponents. This occurs using the [Varieties-of-Democracy-Database](#), which offers numerous variables that can provide a valid depiction of the individual components of the concept tree.
- III. **Aggregation:** The subsequent step in the work process is elaborating the aggregation, i.e. a calculation serving to provide a theoretically well-founded bundling of the values that have been measured by the indicators. Two aspects are important here: the choice of the level of aggregation and the choice of the aggregation rule (Munck/Verkuilen 2002). The democracy matrix allows for different levels of aggregation. Besides an overall value, it is also possible to determine the democratic quality of an individual matrix field, of an institution and of a dimension. The aggregation rules are theoretically grounded: whereas addition makes possible compensation, multiplication in the sense of a necessary condition does not allow for this (Munck/Verkuilen 2002). Furthermore, the partial functions and core functions within a field have to be subjected to weighing.

On the following pages, the conception will now be depicted: thus, the [democracy definition](#) underlying the democracy matrix will be presented; the [interplay of the dimensions of](#)


[democracy](#), in the sense of complementary and conflicting relations, will be expounded; and the three [measurement levels](#) and the [regime typology](#) will be described. Information on the concept tree and its operationalisation, on the other hand, is to be found [here](#); the aggregation is explained [here](#).

2. The Democracy Definition of the Democracy Matrix

There is no consensus in politics, scholarship and society about what democracy means in detail. Where does democracy begin and where does it end? Hence, various definitions and understandings of the concept of democracy are to be found in the discourses that for centuries, from Aristotle until today, have dealt with the subject. These can be similar, but they can also partially contradict each other.

In democracy theory, however, three different scopes within the conceptions have coalesced, which refer to different conceptual range (Bühlmann et al. 2012): minimal definitions, middle-range definitions and maximal definitions.

Fig. 1: Range of Democracy Definitions



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There is a large consensus about the **minimal definition**, which defines democracy by way of the repeated holding of elections with a minimum amount of competition between candidates and the participative inclusion of broad parts of the population (Dahl 1971); nonetheless, it has been pointed out that this definition is considerably too limited (Lauth 2004; Munck 2012).

Thanks to its recourse to the concept of electoral democracy, it largely succeeds in identifying the key characteristics that distinguish between autocratic and democratic systems. On the other hand, it fails to provide a nuanced treatment of the differences within the grey area between autocracies and democracies, as well as within established democracies, in the case of which it is not so much the level of development of the characteristic “elections” that differs as rather the quality of the rule of law, of the media system, of the separation of powers, and of intermediation.

Maximal definitions, like social democracy, which serves to orient the approach of O’Donnell et al. (2004), have likewise proven to be inappropriate, since, by including socio-economic factors and the welfare state, they overextend the concept of democracy in the sense of a “conceptual stretching” (Sartori 1970; Collier/Mahon 1993). When this understanding of democracy refers to the output side, it is also called a material conception of democracy. Nonetheless, this idea is not convincing, since it posits a definite policy achievement, which, however, has not been established by the sovereign itself, as norm. Hence, democracy cannot be materially defined by way of the production of certain policy achievements, but rather democracy is the procedural framework within which different policy solutions are first negotiated (Lauth 2004; Munck 2012).

Middle-range definitions are thus much more promising. Such definitions enrich the minimal democracy concept only to the extent necessary for a differentiated analysis, and they, thereby, remain within the boundaries of a narrow and procedural understanding of democracy. It is precisely this understanding of democracy that underlies the democracy matrix as standard. By analysing the debates in democracy theory, a conception of democracy can be obtained that, on the one hand, is based on the dimensions of political freedom, political equality, and political and legal control and, on the other, distinguishes between five essential institutions that cut across the dimensions (procedures of decision, regulation of the intermediate sphere, public communication, guarantee of rights, and rules settlement and implementation).

The democracy matrix thus **defines democracy** as “a legal form of rule”, which makes possible self-determination for all citizens, in the sense of popular sovereignty, by securing their significant participation in filling political decision-making positions (and/or in the decision itself) in free, competitive and fair processes (e.g. elections) and securing opportunities for continuously influencing the political process, and by, in general, guaranteeing political rule is subject to oversight. Democratic participation in political rule thus gets expressed in the dimensions of political freedom, political equality and political and legal control (Lauth 2004: 100).

3. The Three Dimensions of the Democracy Matrix

Political Freedom as Free Self-Government of Citizens

The dimension of freedom is anchored in the free self-government of citizens in a political community. **Self-government** involves the transfer of individual preferences by way of the choice of political decision-makers in free and fair elections and, furthermore, the possibility of continuous political participation, which is structured within the framework of the public sphere via competing intermediate organisations. The political participation of citizens is guaranteed by the existence of **civil and political rights**. Furthermore, popular sovereignty implies that the elected representatives are also in fact the possessors of political power and use the latter in such a way that individual rights are respected.

Political Equality as Legal Equality of Treatment and Fair Participation in Political Decisions

The dimension of equality is understood as political equality, which, on the one hand, includes a fair formal equality of treatment of citizens by the state (**legal egalitarianism**) and, on the other hand, facilitates the opportunity for all citizens to participate in the relevant formal democratic institutions in a fair and effective way (**input egalitarianism**). Whereas the dimension of freedom treats the possibility of free participation in the political system in an active sense, the dimension of equality deals with equal access to these rights. Do all citizens have the possibility to make use of their political and civil rights in a fair and effective way? Talk here is thus of equality in the sense of equal treatment as a passive component.

Political and Legal Control as Political and Legal Oversight of the Government

Whereas the dimension of freedom gives expression to the preferences of individual citizens and organised interests, in the dimension of political and legal control, the actions of these agents are now directed toward the monitoring of government activity. Such oversight applies to both the government and the elected officeholders. **Vertical and horizontal accountability** are to be included in the definition of the dimension of control. Control takes place by way of the political participation of citizens or intermediary organisations in the political sphere or the sphere of civil society or via media, which expose violations of the rule of law in the public sphere and, if necessary, undertake legal measures. It occurs, above all, by way of the official oversight instances within the network of governmental and para-governmental institutions. The sole standard of legal control is that government action respects the rule of law.

4. The Five Institutions of the Democracy Matrix

Procedures of Decision: Quality of Elections

In democracy, the participation of citizens in binding decisions primarily occurs by way of the election of representatives. Nonetheless, with the exception of legislative initiatives, which represent a form of direct democracy and which we take into consideration in [trade-off measurement](#), hardly any oversight is exercised in the election itself; the latter rather is, in turn, subjected to oversight by non-governmental actors and instances. In democracies, as is shown by the discussion of its dimensions, the characterisation of an election is necessarily done using the following **electoral principles**, which apply for elections that take place regularly and at not too great intervals. According to these principles, elections must be universal, equal, free and secret.

Regulation of the Intermediate Sphere: Quality of Parties, Interest Groups and Civil Society

Intermediate organisations like political parties, associations and civil society should be structured in such a way that they are able to articulate, select and bundle social interests, in order to communicate them to governmental decision-making instances and, at the same time, to allow for a feedback effect. What is at stake is the most inclusive possible representation of citizens' preferences. The sole binding of policy formation to the act of voting is insufficient for a democratic process. For, in addition, via the influence of organised interests, there has to be an ongoing debate on political decisions during the legislative period. A democratic system of mediation has to have sufficient **openness**, such that certain interests are not systematically filtered out, but rather have the opportunity to be made visible. Finally, we have to mention the oversight function that organised interests discharge vis-à-vis the government.

Public Communication: Quality of Media

The institution of the public Communication is to be seen as the key forum for opinion and will formation. Democratic communication thereby requires **publicity** and **transparency**. The public sphere constitutes the medium for information communication for the purposes of influence and oversight, and it is, hereby, open for different sorts of formal and informal participation, which together stamp the structure of the public sphere. The structure of the public sphere manages to secure them institutionally by way of the guarantee of freedom of opinion and freedom of information. A certain amount of freedom of information, in the sense of creating transparency of government action, is to be regarded as the presupposition for successful oversight of the government. The rights of the media themselves and the rights of

those who want to use the public sphere as a forum are key units of analysis for determining the quality of democracy.

Guarantee of Rights: Quality of the Rule of Law

The institution of guarantee of rights is a reflexive institution, since it is tied to the guaranteeing of the other institutions and the rights on which they are based. The usual sort of this form of participation takes place by way of the courts, whereby individual citizens or a group of citizens (association, collective, party, etc.) assume the role of instigator of the proceedings and trial participants. This can facilitate a targeted and binding influence on political decisions or on their implementation. Thereby, certain actions are either prohibited, confirmed or initiated. The preservation of the fundamental rights that are relevant to the rule of law is the key aspect. What is at issue here is the legal review of decisions that have already been taken or carried out. The characteristic idea of this institution is the oversight of government action and decision-making by individual citizens or organisations via the **legal route of the courts**.

Rules Settlement and Implementation: Quality of Effective Power of Government and Horizontal Accountability

At the same time, we need to include the governmental institutions to which the sovereign assigns the task of exercising democratic rule. Two functions are of decisive importance here. On the one hand, within the framework of effective governmental power, state institutions must be able to take decisions and to implement the decisions that have been democratically taken. This implies, in particular, the necessity of effectively free government, which can operate independently of potential veto players (e.g. the military) that have not been democratically legitimated. For a functional democracy is always effective political rule. In a larger sense, this also concerns statehood as maintenance of the state's monopoly on the use of force, as well as the ability of the administration to work effectively.

On the other hand, all oversight aspects that are located in the political system itself (e.g. parliament, ombudsman, court of auditors) are to be considered in the sense of a horizontal accountability. For the functioning of democracy, it is of central importance whether these state institutions also possess the competencies that they require and whether they use these competencies within the legal framework provided and do not abuse them.

Table 1: Overview of the Institutions of the Democracy Matrix

Institution	Function	Key Question
Procedures of Decision	Decision-making function; participation of citizens in binding decisions via elections	“Are elections and referenda free, are they equal, and is the holding and evaluation of elections and referenda subject to independent and transparent oversight?”
Regulation of the Intermediate Sphere	Function of interest aggregation and articulation; communication to the political system (party → political power; association/civil society → political influence)	“Can all relevant interests be organised and are they all treated equally? Do the organised interests exercise oversight of government action?”
Public Communication	Function of reaching agreement (communication rights); public sphere as a medium of political communication for exerting influence and oversight; presupposition for other institutions	“Do communicative rights exist and does everyone have the same opportunity to make use of them? Is communication used by the media themselves and other civil society actors as a forum for oversight?”
Guarantee of Rights	Function of guaranteeing the principles of the rule of law in the sense of legal oversight of governmental action; guarantees the functioning of the other institutions (reflexive institution)	“Is the possibility of taking legal action via the courts open to all and the same for all? Are all subject to the law, can a decision be appealed, and is the abuse of political power effectively sanctioned?”
Rules Settlement and Implementation	Function of implementing democratic decisions (monopoly on the use of force, administration); function of oversight in the political system (horizontal accountability)	“Does the government possess effective governing power? Is there a monopoly on the use of force and an effective administration? Is everyone treated equally by the parliament and by the public administration? Are there oversight rights (parliament, court of auditors) in the political system itself?”

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5. The 15 Matrix Fields of the Democracy Matrix

By combining the three dimensions and the five institutions, we derive the democracy matrix's 15 matrix fields, which demarcate the **relevant areas of investigation for democracy quality**. The dimensions constitute the horizontal pillars, whereas the institutions cut across them. A detailed description of the components and subcomponents of the individual matrix fields can be consulted [here](#).

Fig. 2: The Matrix Fields of the Democracy Matrix

	Freedom	Equality	Control
<i>Procedures of Decision</i>	Free Elections	Equal Opportunity to Participate, Equal Vote	Oversight by Electoral Commission
<i>Regulation of the Intermediate Sphere</i>	Freedom to Organise	Equal Rights to Organise and to Act	Oversight via Associations, Political Parties and Civil Society
<i>Public Communication</i>	Communicative Freedoms	Equal Opportunity to Participate	Oversight by Media
<i>Guarantee of Rights</i>	Independence of the Judiciary, Legal Security	Equal Rights and Equal Treatment by the Judiciary	Effective Jurisprudence
<i>Rules Settlement and Implementation</i>	Independence of the Government, Effective Government	Equal Treatment by Parliament and Public Administration	Oversight by Parliament and Public Administration

source: own presentation

6. The Interplay of the Democracy Dimensions – Complementary and Conflicting (Trade-Off) Relations

In contrast to other tools for measuring democracy, the democracy matrix distinguishes two different types of influence of democracy dimensions among themselves (Lauth/Schlenkrich 2018; Lauth 2016a). On the one hand, the dimensions reciprocally support one another in the form of complementary effects. On the other hand, they can come into conflict and trade-offs can arise. Both relations will now be described in greater detail.

Complementary Effects of Democracy Dimensions (Basic Concept)

The dimensions are not only necessary for understanding democracy, but they also **reciprocally condition and support one another**. Dworkin emphasises the close relations between them (1996: 57): “So we have come, by different routes, beginning in different traditions and paradigms, to conceptions of liberty and equality that seem not only compatible but mutually necessary”. In democracy theory, freedom without a minimum of equality is as little thinkable as equality without freedom. Control is required for securing and realising them: control that, in turn, marks the boundaries of democratic rule in the orientation to legally established norms of freedom and equality. This reciprocal reinforcing effect between the dimensions expresses the **basic concept** of the democracy matrix: all dimensions and hence all 15 matrix fields must be sufficiently functional, in order to classify a country as democratic.

Conflicting Effects of the Democracy Dimensions (Trade-Offs)

Despite this complementary relationship structure, potential tensions are not to be ignored (Diamond/Morlino 2004). The relations are all the more conflictual, the greater the number of presuppositions of a dimension or the more rigid it is. If we consider the degree of development of the dimensions on a scale, the following thesis can be affirmed: whereas in the greater part of the scale, the dimensions reciprocally condition and need one another, competing goals come into conflict when maximum values are strived for.

These reflections on the conflict potential of the three dimensions can be summarised as follows: an “optimal” or “perfect” democracy cannot, in principle, be based on the complete implementation of all three dimensions, but rather gets expressed in a suitable gradual realisation, which preserves a balance between them. Conflicting effects (trade-offs) can also

be understood as a normative dilemma for democratic societies. They give expression to a **political conflict over values**, on which a society has to take a position. Stressing one value, which has been selected in a process of negotiation by the different social forces (Bühlmann et al. 2012: 123), changes the degrees of development of the individual dimensions and their weights relative to one another. The conflicting effects of the dimensions or trade-offs give citizens the opportunity to shape their democracy according to their normative conception: they find themselves “in the downright paradoxical situation of having over and over to come to agreement about the rules of the game without, however, abandoning the game” (Lauth 2004: 99).

Definition of Trade-Offs

In democracies, a relevant trade-off meets the following conditions:

- I. **The trade-off is political in nature:** just as democracy and democracy quality are purely politically or procedurally defined, trade-offs are only relevant for democracy quality, if they are situated in the political sphere. Hence, economic trade-offs are not considered.
- II. A trade-off arises, because **only one institution fulfils a given political function in one dimension**. At the same time, this institution necessarily generates contrary or inverse effects in another dimension that is connected to the same function. This relationship means that a choice has to be made between different institutional designs. The resulting institutional solution involves specific advantages, but also disadvantages.
- III. **Opposing democracy concepts, which are thus interrelated**, deploy different institutional solutions for the same function. These conceptions have an equal normative weight and it is equally possible to justify them. In addition, they are recognised as having the same amount of democracy quality, which means that the conceptions and their institutional decisions are neutral with regard to the quality of democracy. In the end, every conception of democracy emphasises different political values, while others are neglected (e.g. freedom as opposed to equality). This means that they exhibit a different dimensional structuring of the same democratic quality. Hence, due to their connection to different conceptions of democracy, institutions emphasise various democracy dimensions.
- IV. If an institution **overemphasises one side of the trade-off**, inasmuch as it completely ignores the other pole, an overextension of a trade-off occurs, and this harms the basic concept. However, we would no longer speak of a trade-off when a democracy leaves the democratic space (e.g. by overvaluing the control dimension at the cost of the freedom dimension: a constitutional court that acts as a super-legislature). In this case, the basic concept, in the sense of the mutually supporting effects, is damaged.

This interpretation distinguishes between two levels of abstraction: institutions and dimensions. The fundamental claim is that it is not possible completely to realise all three dimensions of the

democracy matrix, since they are inevitably tied to conflicting goals. This assumption does not mean, however, that every democratic conception, as liberal or republican democracy, problematises decisions as trade-offs. The reason for this is trivial: such conceptions have already decided upon their preferred dimensions. The idea of trade-offs between different democratic conceptions becomes clear for participants when one attempts completely to realise two different democracy concepts at the same time. The close connection between institutions and dimensions makes possible the measurement of dimensional trade-offs. The tensions between the dimensions get manifest in institutional decisions.

In short, a trade-off in democracies can be defined as follows: *a trade-off is an insoluble link between two inverse effects of an institution with regard to two dimensions. This trade-off expresses two contrary, but normatively equal, conceptions of democracy to which the chosen institutions pertain.*

Identification of Relevant Trade-Offs

Majoritarian and consensus democracies (Lijphart 2012) are obviously opposed concepts of democracy, which cannot be realised simultaneously. The former focuses on **majority rule**, the latter on an extended system of **reciprocal control**. Whereas consensus democracy thus emphasises several veto point structures, which restrict the action of governments (e.g. strong second chambers, coalitions, constitutional courts), the ideal-typical development of majoritarian democratic structures favours structures with more limited oversight capacities. Consensus democracy can also be understood as a constitutional democracy, whose core element is a strong constitutional court. Popular legislative initiatives are included as a further trade-off element.

Table 2: Trade-Off between Majoritarian and Consensus Democracy

	Majoritarian Democracy	Consensus Democracy
Function	Effective government	
	High	Low
Institution	One-party government	Coalitions/divided governments
	Unicameral systems	Bicameral systems
	No popular initiatives	Popular initiatives
	No constitutional court	Constitutional court
Dimension	Freedom	Control

source: own presentation

The second opposition is the gap between libertarian and egalitarian conceptions of democracy, which relate to the tension between freedom and equality. Whereas egalitarian democracies underscore **political equality**, libertarian democracy focuses on the realisation of **political freedom**. This trade-off has triggered profound ideological and philosophical conflicts (Dworkin 1996). The table lists the different institutions that constitute the trade-off between

the two dimensions (freedom and equality). These institutions, their effects and the measurement of the trade-offs are discussed in greater detail [here](#).

Table 3: Trade-Off between Libertarian and Egalitarian Democracy

	Libertarian Democracy	Egalitarian Democracy
Function	Access to the government; influence	
	Free	Equal
Institution	Majoritarian electoral system	Proportional electoral system
	Voting not compulsory	Compulsory voting
	No gender quotas	Gender quotas
	Unregulated financing of political parties	Equal financing of political parties
	Unregulated media access	Equal media access
Dimension	Freedom	Equality

source: own presentation

Quality Measuring vs. Trade-Off Indicators

On the level of operationalisation, the conceptual distinction between the complementary and the conflicting effects of the dimensions is captured by two different types of indicators. **Quality-measuring indicators** undertake regime classification, by referring to the constitutive elements of democracy quality. Hence, their scale comprises the entire spectrum of regimes from autocracies to democracies. The dimensions have a reciprocally supportive effect, and thus maximum values are possible in each dimension. This type of indicator is the point of departure for classical democracy measurement and is used by Polity, Freedom House and the Bertelsmann Transformation Index. However, given the assumption of the complementary effects of the dimensions, no highly differing dimension values are possible here in the domain of working democracies.

Trade-off indicators serve for determining the democracy profile of democracies and, hence, for structuring the democratic domain using the dimensions. The latter no longer provide reciprocal support to one another, but rather are characterised by opposing dependencies in the sense of trade-offs. Therefore, maximum values are not possible simultaneously in each dimension. The conflicting effects are not characterized by generally differing degrees of democracy quality, but rather by the distribution of democracy quality in different dimensions: whereas in the case of the quality-measuring indicators, differing degrees of development of the dimensions are the result of transformative and hence qualitatively gradual differences (**quality profile**), in the case of the trade-off indicators, differences in the dimensions represent qualitatively equivalent differences between dimensions whose goals are in socially-defined conflict and that are reflected in a democratic institutional set (**democracy profile**).

Table 4: Quality Measuring vs. Trade-Off Indicators

Quality-Measuring Indicators	Trade-Off Indicators
Complementary effects of the dimensions	Conflicting effects of the dimensions (value conflicts)
Universality: autocracies and democracies	Only democracies
Gradual quality differences in regimes	Equivalent quality differences in democracies
One-dimensional interpretation	Two-dimensional interpretation
Quality profile	Democracy profile


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Hence, trade-off indicators are interpreted in a different way than quality-measuring indicators: whereas quality-measuring indicators experience a **one-dimensional evaluation** going from a low to a high value for democracy quality, trade-off indicators are always interpreted with respect to two dimensions in the sense of a **two-dimensional interpretation**, such that the two ends of the scale stand for different dimensions. One extreme represents high values in one dimension and low values in another dimension – and vice-versa for the other extreme of the scale. The chosen trade-off relationships are found [here](#).

7. The Three Levels of Measurement of the Democracy Matrix

The democracy matrix recognizes three different levels of measurement, offering differing perspectives, which build on one another, on the democracy quality of a country. It distinguishes between core measurement, context measurement and trade-off measurement.

Fig. 3: The Three Levels of Measurement of the Democracy Matrix



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As first level of measurement, **core measurement** represents the basic point of departure of the measurement and aims at the functioning of key democratic institutions and hence at the **quality of endogenous characteristics** of democracy.

Context measurement is more comprehensive, but also more realistic. **Exogenous factors** are also included, like, in particular, the informal institutions of corruption and level of violence, as are socio-economic conditions such as education inequality. Nonetheless, the democracy matrix remains within the bounds of a middle-range definition, since here too only such contextual factors are included as either qualitatively change the functioning of formal institutions or give rise to political inequality by way of social inequality in the sense of **necessary conditions**. Hence, not all social factors of inequality are included that have the effect of promoting or hindering democracy quality, but rather only such as whose impact necessarily produces quality-reducing effects. We include here education in its elementary form, which determines the extent to which citizens know and can exercise their rights. We also take up informal institutions that, like corruption, exhibit the same negative modes of impact.

Finally, the **trade-off level of measurement** studies the impact on democracy quality of institutional democracy design. On this level of measurement, only democracies are studied: such as have been determined by way of core measurement. The decision to adopt a particular institutional design is not tied to a higher democracy quality, but rather what is at issue are **normatively equal and justifiable decisions**. Democracy designs have a preference for a particular dimension of democracy. But, seen from the perspective of democracy theory, this preference for one dimension comes at the expense of another dimension, such that democracy quality is distributed over different dimensions. This is reflected in the trade-off.


8. The Regime Typology of the Democracy Matrix

The democracy matrix distinguishes between two **basic types** of regimes (Lauth 2016b): autocracies and democracies. Whereas, per the definition of the democracy matrix, democracies are defined by the preservation of the dimensions of political freedom, political equality, and political and legal control, as well as a democratic functional logic in five key institutions, the root concept of autocracy is characterised by the fact that these dimensions and these institutions are either not developed at all or are only very weakly developed. In addition, the basic type of democracy is further differentiated by an **attenuated sub-type**. Deficient democracy is distinguished by the fact that it exhibits all the characteristics of the basic type, but, nonetheless, some of its characteristics are only partially developed. Finally, a subdivision into **hybrid regimes** also takes place (Bogaards 2009). Hybrid types are not attenuated subtypes, since they do not lack the full development of a characteristic, but rather they exhibit a mixture of characteristics of both basic types, so that they simultaneously combine autocratic and democratic dimensions or institutions.

The regime types are called quality profiles, since they are the result of gradual qualitative differences. They are thereby distinguished from the democracy profiles, which come into

being on the basis of the different, but qualitatively equivalent structuring of the dimensions among themselves in the sense of trade-off measurement.

Fig. 4: The Regime Continuum of the Democracy Matrix



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